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According to theories of emotional complexity, individuals low in emotional complexity encode and represent emotions in visceral
or action-oriented terms, whereas individuals high in emotional complexity encode and represent emotions in a differentiated
way, using multiple emotion concepts. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants viewed valenced animated
scenarios of simple ball-like figures attending either to social or spatial aspects of the interactions. Participant’s emotional
complexity was assessed using the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale. We found a distributed set of brain regions previously
implicated in processing emotion from facial, vocal and bodily cues, in processing social intentions, and in emotional response,
were sensitive to emotion conveyed by motion alone. Attention to social meaning amplified the influence of emotion in a subset of
these regions. Critically, increased emotional complexity correlated with enhanced processing in a left temporal polar region
implicated in detailed semantic knowledge; with a diminished effect of social attention; and with increased differentiation of
brain activity between films of differing valence. Decreased emotional complexity was associated with increased activity in
regions of pre-motor cortex. Thus, neural coding of emotion in semantic vs action systems varies as a function of emotional
complexity, helping reconcile puzzling inconsistencies in neuropsychological investigations of emotion recognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Our knowledge of others’ emotions clearly depends on their
perceptible reactions, i.e. facial, vocal and bodily expressions
(Darwin, 1872). It is unclear, however, what the fundamental
building blocks of emotional expression and perception
are. Michotte (1950) asserted that social perception is
grounded in the analysis of motion cues (e.g. approach,
avoidance, contact intensity). Indeed, 1-year-old infants
can attribute emotional valence ( ) to interactions between
ball-like figures in simplistic two-dimensional animations,
based on simple motion cues, e.g. collision intensity (hard
contact–negative, soft contact–positive) (Premack and
Premack, 1997). Such cues are used pan-culturally (Rime ´
et al., 1985).
Neuroscience has implicated several brain structures in
emotion recognition, including the amygdala, occipitotem-
poral neocortex, insula, somatosensory cortex, basal ganglia,
ventral premotor cortex, and medial and orbital prefrontal
cortex (Heberlein and Adolphs, 2007). Some regions, e.g. the
amygdala are activated by minimal emotion cues, and in the
absence of attention (Adolphs, 2008), although the extent to
which these brain regions are sensitive to the basic motion
cues emphasised by Michotte is unclear.
Understanding of emotions is, however, knowledge driven
as well as rooted in structure detection: we discern others’
emotions via a complex combination of structure-detection
skills and relevant knowledge (Baldwin and Baird, 2001;
Marshall and Cohen, 1988). That there are potentially large
individual differences in emotion knowledge may help
account for the puzzling finding that, even when tested
using the same emotion-recognition tasks, patients with
comparable brain lesions do not always show similar deficits,
a finding for which there has been no satisfying explanation
(Heberlein and Adolphs, 2007).
Here, we address the influence of a key individual differ-
ence, namely, individual differences in propositional knowl-
edge for emotion or emotional complexity (Lindquist and
Feldman-Barrett, 2008), as measured by the Levels of
Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane et al., 1990).
According to Lane and colleagues (Lane and Pollerman,
2002), individuals low in emotional complexity encode and
represent emotion knowledge in visceral or action-oriented
terms, whereas individuals high in emotional complexity
encode and represent emotion knowledge in a nuanced
and differentiated fashion, using multiple emotion concepts.
Increased emotional complexity predicts more normative
identification of emotion cues in others and greater empathy
(Ciarrochi et al., 2003; Lane et al., 1996, 2000).
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nance imaging (fMRI), participants viewed animated
scenarios of simple ball-like figures open to interpretation
in terms of emotional attributes. Participants were cued to
pay attention to social or spatial aspects of the figures’
behaviour. Given that individuals with greater levels of
emotional complexity are hypothesised to have more
detailed and more differentiated emotion concepts, and to
rely less on visceral or action-oriented emotion coding, we
predicted that increased emotional complexity would be
associated with greater activation in neural regions linked
to detailed conceptual knowledge [left temporal poles
(TP)] (Rogers et al., 2006), together with reduced activity
in brain regions linked to processing visceral/action-oriented
components of emotion (hypothalamus, premotor cortex),
(Leslie et al., 2004; Thompson and Swanson, 2003) and with
greater differentiation between positively vs negatively
valenced animations in brain regions coding emotional
valence and discrete emotion categories (Murphy et al.,
2003; Vytal and Hamman, 2009). In addition, by manipulat-
ing attention to social meaning, we could examine the extent
to which activity in key neural structures was dependent on
attention, and how this interacted with individual differences
in emotional complexity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
During fMRI, participants were asked to watch a series of
short animations. Each showed two ‘sprites’ moving with
properties that support varying emotional interpretations
(affiliative, antagonistic, neutral social behaviours) in a
two-dimensional ‘sprite world’ (Figure 1). Participants
were pre-cued to attend either to the social behaviour that
could underlie the movement of the sprites or to the spatial
aspects of the same movement. Following the fMRI session,
participants completed the LEAS (Lane et al., 1990)
(see below for details).
Participants
Sixteen healthy right-handed female, native English speaking
individuals (mean age¼24 years, s.d.¼4 years) partici-
pated. The study was approved by the Cambridgeshire
Local Research Ethics Committee and performed in compli-
ance with their guidelines. Written informed consent was
obtained from all participants. Individuals with a history
of inpatient psychiatric care; neurological disease, or head
injury were excluded, as were individuals on medication for
anxiety or depression. Following the fMRI session, partici-
pants completed the LEAS (Lane et al., 1990) (see below for
details). Only female volunteers were scanned as previous
work has found considerable sex differences in LEAS
scores, with women outperforming men (Barrett et al.,
2000; Ciarrochi et al., 2003). We did not control for men-
strual cycle phase. In future studies, it will be important to
examine both potential menstrual cycle phase effects in
women and potential neural sex differences in the effects
of LEAS (McRae et al., 2008).
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 14-s duration animations, display-
ing the motion of two sprites one green circle and one blue
circle in a two-dimensional environment (the sprite world),
which included some obstacles to motion in a straight line
(see Figure 1 and example movies can be viewed at http://
www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/research/emotion/cemhp/tavare-
saffant.html). Animations were created using the software
package Blender version 2.1 (Blender Foundation, http://
www.blender.org). Three categories of animation were con-
structed, designed to convey the impression of three types of
interpersonal situation: (i) Affiliative interactions between
the two sprites; (ii) Antagonistic interactions between the
two sprites; and (3) Neutral, (non)-interactions between
the two sprites.
In the affiliative animations, the two sprites entered from
different sides of the sprite-world. They approached each
other, and gently touched, suggesting affection, then
moved in a mutually coordinated fashion throughout. In
the antagonistic animations, the two sprites entered from
different sides of the sprite-world and approached each
other. They initially maintained a distance from each
other, while moving around slowly. In one half of the ani-
mations, they then approached each other, making brief,
hard contact with each other and retreating rapidly, suggest-
ing physical aggression. In the other half, they never touched,
but circled each other in a manner suggestive of hostility. At
the end of the sequence, the two sprites left the scene quickly
and in different directions. In the emotionally neutral ani-
mations, the two sprites entered from different sides of the
sprite-world. They moved around, sometimes stopping and
changing direction, but never approaching or withdrawing
from each other. The sprites then left the scene indepen-
dently at a gentle pace. Fig. 1 Schematic of animations.
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During scanning, each animation (affiliative, antagonistic or
neutral) was preceded by a cue word, either ‘behavioural’ or
‘spatial’, specifying how they should attend to the scenarios.
For the behavioural cue, participants were instructed to
identify what type of interaction might be happening
between the two sprites (affiliative, antagonistic or neutral).
For the spatial cue, participants were instructed to pay atten-
tion to various aspects of the motion of the two sprites, such
as speed, trajectory, position of entering/exiting the scene,
etc. As a manipulation check, following the presentation of
each animation, a summary statement appeared describing
the contents of the animation, and the participants had to
judge (true/false) if the statement could appropriately
describe the preceding animation. Examples of behavioural
statements include: ‘A woman met her partner in an art
gallery’ (affiliative), ‘Street kids were insulting each other’
(antagonistic) and ‘Two joggers were exercising around a
park’ (neutral). Examples of spatial statements include:
‘The blue circle stayed in the bottom left-hand corner’,
‘The circles completed a figure of eight movement.’ The
statement accurately described the content of each anima-
tion in 50% of cases. Each animation and each statement was
presented only once. The cue word was presented for 1.8s,
the animation for 14s and the statement for 7.5s. In addi-
tion, a baseline fixation condition was used. In this
condition, the cue word ‘cross’ appeared, followed by a
fixation-cross for 14s, and then a statement saying that the
participants should press either the left or right response
button. There were 12 examples of each of the animations
(affiliative, antagonistic and neutral) in each of the two con-
ditions (behavioural or spatial cue) plus baseline condition.
Animations (affiliative, antagonistic and neutral) and task
(behavioural or spatial cue) were presented in pseudorando-
mised, counterbalanced fashion.
Post-task ratings of the animations
Following scanning, participants rated each animation seen
during fMRI for valence and emotional intensity using visual
analogue scales with lines 11.5-cm long. For valence,
the scale ranged from positive (0cm) through neutral
(5.75cm) to negative (11.5cm). For intensity ratings, the
scale ranged from low (0cm) to high (11.5cm). The
period of time between the imaging study and the ratings
task ranged from 0 days to 6 weeks, depending on the avail-
ability of the participant (average  2 weeks).
Levels of emotional awareness
Emotional Awareness is the ability to recognise and describe
emotion in oneself and others. According to Lane and
colleagues’ Piagetian model (Lane and Pollerman, 2002;
Lane and Schwartz, 1987), the development of emotional
awareness comprises five stages, ranging from awareness of
physical sensations to the capacity to appreciate complexity
in the emotional experiences of self and other. The LEAS
(Lane et al., 1990) is a written performance measure that
asks an individual to describe her anticipated emotions
and those of another person in each of 20 short scenarios
described in two to four sentences. One scenario is presented
per page, followed by two questions, ‘How would you feel?’
and ‘How would the other person feel?’ at the top of each
page. Participants write their responses on the remainder of
each page. They are instructed to use as much or as little of
the page as is needed to answer the two questions.
Scoring is based on specific criteria aimed at determining
the degree of specificity in the emotion terms used and the
range of emotions described, and the differentiation of self
from other. Each of the 20 scenarios receives a score of 0–5,
corresponding to the stages of the developmental model
underpinning the LEAS. A score of 0 is assigned when
non-affective words are used; a score of 1 when words indi-
cating physiological cues are used in the description (e.g. ‘I’d
feel tired’); a score of 2 when words are used that convey
undifferentiated emotion (e.g. ‘I’d feel bad’) or when the
word ‘feel’ is used to convey an action tendency (e.g. ‘I’d
feel like punching the wall’); a score of 3 when one word con-
veying a typical differentiated emotion is used (e.g. angry,
happy, etc); a score of 4 when two or more level 3 words are
used in a way that conveys greater emotional differentiation
than would either word alone. Participants receive a separate
score for the ‘self’ response and for the ‘other’ response,
ranging from 0–4. In addition, a total LEAS score is given
to each scenario equal to the higher of the ‘self’ and ‘other’
scores. A score of 5 is assigned to the total when ‘self’ and
‘other’ each receive a score of 4; thus the maximum LEAS
score is 100, with higher total scores indicating greater
awareness of emotional complexity in self and other.
A computerized LEAS scoring program has recently been
developed (Barchard et al., in press).
The LEAS has high inter-rater reliability, internal consis-
tency (e.g. ¼0.89, Ciarrochi et al., 2003) and test-retest
reliability. It is only weakly correlated with measures of
verbal ability. Ramponi et al. (2004) found a non-significant
correlation (r¼0.02) between LEAS scores and the
National Adult Reading Test; Lane et al. (1995) found a
correlation of r¼0.17 between LEAS scores and the
Shipley Institute of Living Scale Vocabulary Subtest. In a
large sample (n¼869) of students, a correlation of 0.15
was found between LEAS and Thurstone’s Reading Test
scores (Romero et al., 2008). Furthermore, sex differences
in LEAS are still significant when controlling for verbal abil-
ity (Barrett et al., 2000). These data indicate that the LEAS is
not just a measure of verbal ability. Nor is LEAS correlated
with scores on the affective intensity, manifest anxiety or
Beck Depression Scales (Lane and Pollerman, 2002) nor
with the big five personality dimensions (Ciarrochi et al.,
2003), and there are only low or non-significant correlations
between LEAS and the Toronto Alexithymia scale (Ciarrochi
et al., 2003; Lane et al., 1998; Lumley et al., 2005; Suslow
et al., 2000). Scores on the LEAS are related to the
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Intelligence Test and to the attention to mood scale of the
Trait Meta-Mood scale (Lumley et al., 2005), to the perceiv-
ing emotions in stories of the Multifactor Emotional
Intelligence Scale (MEIS) (Ciarrochi et al., 2003), to the
range and differentiation of emotional experience scale
(RDEES) (Kang and Shaver, 2004) and have been shown
to predict accuracy of facial emotion recognition (Lane
et al., 1996, 2000) and self-reported empathy (Ciarrochi
et al., 2003).
Two raters scored the LEAS independently. The inter-rater
reliability was good (tau-b¼0.893, N¼100, p<0.01). On
the LEAS, participants’ scores ranged from 65 to 90
(mean¼77, s.d.  6.7). These scores are similar to pub-
lished values for young university student populations
(Ciarrochi et al., 2003), but somewhat higher than those
reported for broader community samples (Barrett et al.,
2000).
Image acquisition
Blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast func-
tional images were acquired with echo-planar T2*-weighted
(EPI) images using a Medspec (Bruker, Ettlingen, Germany)
3-T MR system with a head coil gradient set. Each image
volume consisted of 21 interleaved 4-mm-thick slices
(inter-slice gap: 1mm; in-plane resolution: 2.2 2.2mm;
field of view: 20 20cm; matrix size: 90 90; flip angle:
748; echo time: 27.5ms; voxel bandwidth: 143kHz; repeti-
tion time: 1.6s). Slice acquisition was transverse oblique,
angled to avoid the eyeballs, and covered most of the
brain. Six hundred and ninety-five volumes were acquired
in one continuous run, and the first six volumes were dis-
carded to allow for T1 equilibration.
Image analysis
fMRI data were analysed using statistical parametric map-
ping software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,
London, UK). Standard pre-processing was conducted, com-
prising slice timing correction, realignment, undistortion
(Cusack et al., 2003) and masked normalisation of each par-
ticipant’s EPI data to the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) International Consortium for Brain Mapping tem-
plate (Brett et al., 2001). Images were re-sampled into this
space with 2mm isotropic voxels and smoothed with a
Gaussian kernel of 8mm full-width at half-maximum.
Condition effects were estimated for each participant at
each voxel using boxcar regressors for the 14s animation
period, convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function (HRF) in a general linear model, with spatial rea-
lignment parameters included as regressors to account for
residual movement-related variance. A high-pass filter was
used to remove low-frequency signal drift, and the data were
also low-pass filtered with the canonical HRF. Activation
contrasts between conditions were estimated for each partic-
ipant at each voxel, producing statistical parametric maps.
Random-effects analysis was conducted to analyse data at a
group level, with modulations by levels of emotional aware-
ness assessed by simple regression against LEAS scores.
A priori regions of interest (ROIs) were determined based
on areas activated by emotion, social perception and social
cognition. We used small volume correction (SVC) for mul-
tiple comparisons applied at P<0.05 (family-wise error) fol-
lowing an initial thresholding at P<0.05 uncorrected. The
amygdala, basal ganglia, posterior and anterior cingulate,
insula, postcentral gyrus, inferior and medial orbitofrontal
cortex (OBFC) and hypothalamus were defined using struc-
tural templates derived by automated anatomic labelling
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Spherical ROIs (10mm
radius spheres) were created to sample the lateral fusiform
gyrus (FG) (central coordinates  42,  49,  19; 40,  48,
 16) and dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex
(DMPFC and VMPFC) ( 4, 60, 32; 7, 55, 28 and  2, 48,
 12), by computing the average of the reported activation
coordinates for these regions across previous imaging studies
of animate motion (Castelli et al., 2000, 2002; Martin and
Weisberg, 2003; Ohnishi et al., 2004; Schultz et al., 2003).
For the superior temporal sulcus (STS) we used the coordi-
nates ( 54,  34, 4) taken from Schultz et al. (2004). For the
TPs we used the coordinates ( 44, 14,  27) from Rogers
et al. (2006). For the premotor cortex we used the coordi-
nates (  54, 5, 40) from Gre `zes et al. (2007). For
the periacqueductal grey (PAG) we used the coordinates
(2,  32,  24) from Bartels and Zeki (2004). In addition,
all activations in the vicinity of our ROIs that survived an
uncorrected threshold of P<0.001 and a minimum cluster
size of five voxels are reported for completeness.
For anatomical labelling purposes, activation coordinates
were transformed into the Talairach and Tournoux coordi-
nate system using an automated non-linear transform (Brett
et al., 2001) and labelled with reference to the Talairach
Demon database (http://www.talairach.org) and the atlas of
Talairach and Tournoux (1988). For visualizing activations,
group maps are overlaid on the ICBM 152 structural tem-
plate, an average T1-weighted image of 152 individuals
co-registered to MNI space. Activations are reported using
(x, y, z) coordinates in Talairach (not MNI) coordinates.
RESULTS
Film ratings and post-film probe questions
The post-scan visual analogue scale based valence rat-
ings confirmed that the films were rated as intended
(affiliative–positive; antagonistic–negative; neutral–neutral)
(affiliative mean¼1.3, s.d. ¼0.50; antagonistic
mean¼9.7, s.d.¼0.60, indifferent mean¼5.8, s.d.¼0.21).
With regards to emotional intensity, the antagonistic anima-
tions were considered the most intense of the three, followed
at some distance by the affiliative animations. The neutral
animations were judged to be of low intensity (affiliative
mean¼5.2, s.d.¼2.97; antagonistic mean¼8.9, s.d.¼1.00;
indifferent mean¼2.7, s.d.¼1.76). All these differences
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P<0.001; affiliative vs indifferent: t(15) ¼4.13, P<0.001;
antagonistic vs indifferent: t(15) ¼16.62, P<0.001]. LEAS
scores were not correlated with intensity or valence ratings.
Participants provided the expected response to 92% of the
post-film probe statements and error rates were comparable
across the affiliative, antagonistic and neutral films, 
2¼2.9,
df¼2, P¼0.24, for the two viewing tasks (behavioural, spa-
tial), 
2¼0.072, df¼1, P¼0.79, and for the two response
options (true, false) 
2¼0.13, df¼1, P¼0.72. The high
accuracy rates in both conditions show that the manipula-
tion of attention was successful. Error rates were unrelated to
LEAS scores.
fMRI data
Cross-participant results. Main effect of emotion For the
contrast antagonistic and affiliative vs neutral animations,
collapsed across task (behavioural vs spatial), we found
increased activity at a whole brain corrected P<0.05 in the
right secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) (with a similar
trend in left SII), and at P<0.05 SVC in left and right
amygdala, hypothalamus, left and right lateral fusiform
gyrus, right inferior orbitofrontal gyrus, right precentral
gyrus (with a similar trend in left precentral gyrus), left
postcentral gyrus, and left and right STS (Figure 2). There
was also trend level activation of the right insula. In addition,
at an uncorrected P<0.001 and a cluster extent of five
voxels, there was activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex and in the right TP (Table 1).
Effect of emotion: amplification by social attention For the
contrast antagonistic and affiliative vs neutral animations,
for the behavioural vs spatial task, we found increased activ-
ity in the anterior cingulate cortex (0, 3, 27, Z¼3.6,
Psvc¼0.037) (Figure 3). In addition, at an uncorrected
P<0.001 and a cluster extent of five voxels, there was acti-
vation in following ROIs: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
( 14, 44, 27, Z¼3.66), left insula ( 46,  1, 13, Z¼3.33),
left postcentral gyrus ( 48,  23, 38, Z¼3.58) and right SII
(51,  30, 20, Z ¼ 3.48).
Fig. 2 Main effect of emotional content of animations. (A) Activation in the left amygdala. (B) Activation in the right posterior STS (pSTS), SII and mid/anterior STS extending
into temporal pole.
Table 1 Main effect of emotional content of animations





P whole brain corrected
SII R 57,  34, 18 29 5.51 0.005
PSVC < 0.05
Amygdala L  18,  1,  17 193 4.06 0.002
R 24,  1,  20 215 3.19 0.026
Hypothalamus L  2,  6,  11 97 3.45 0.033
R0 ,  6,  11 132 3.23 0.058
Lateral fusiform gyrus L  42,  40,  18 144 3.84 0.011
R 48,  47,  14 162 3.89 0.009
Inferior orbitofrontal gyrus R 46, 32,  12 474 3.75 0.031
Precentral gyrus R 50, 0, 46 328 3.85 0.044
Postcentral Gyrus L  59,  19, 18 107 4.36 0.01
Superior Temporal Sulcus L  53,  30, 13 198 4.3 0.002
R 55,  39, 4 468 4.64 0.001
Insula R 50, 0, 0 99 3.5 0.067
Punc < 0.001
Medial frontal gyrus R 10, 49, 42 7 3.54 <0.001
Temporal pole R 38, 1,  20 254 3.63 <0.001
Fig. 3 Dorsal ACC activation for the interaction between emotional content and
selective attention.
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rected P<0.05, activations were seen in the early visual cortex
( 6,  99, 9, Z¼5.74; 12,  90, 21, Z¼5.28), and at P<0.05
SVC in right STS (51,  29, 2, Z¼3.82, Psvc¼0.011), and
right postcentral gyrus (28,  42, 51, Z¼4.07, Psvc¼0.024).
At an uncorrected P of<0.001 and an extent threshold of
5 voxels, there was also activation in left SII (–55, –34, 18,
Z¼3.25).
Antagonistic vs affiliative animations: Amplification by
social attention For the contrast antagonistic vs affiliative
animations, for the Behavioural vs Spatial task, there was
increased activity in the medial orbitofrontal gyrus (12, 32,
–12, Z¼3.75, Psvc¼0.015).
Affiliative vs antagonistic animations There were no areas
showing significantly increased activation for the contrast of
affiliative vs antagonistic animations.
Affiliative vs antagonistic animations: amplification by
social attention The contrast affiliative vs antagonistic ani-
mations, for the behavioural vs spatial task, did however
reveal differences in left putamen ( 20, 14, 9, Z¼3.38,
Psvc¼0.051) and right inferior orbitofrontal gyrus (32, 32,
 13, Z¼3.55, Psvc¼0.052).
Correlations with levels of emotional awareness. Main
effect of emotion For the main effect of emotion, a positive
correlation with increasing LEAS was seen in the left TP
( 36, 16,  26, Z¼3.54, Psvc¼0.027) (Figure 4). In addi-
tion negative correlations (i.e. increased activation with
lower LEAS) were seen at a trend level in the hypothalamus
(0,  2,  10, Z¼3.12, Psvc¼0.078) and in the right precen-
tral gyrus (51, 2, 40, Z¼3.55, Psvc¼0.027).
Effect of emotion: amplification by social attention No sig-
nificant positive correlations were seen for this contrast.
There were significant negative correlations with LEAS for
this contrast in the right STS (50,  37, 7, Z¼3.25,
Psvc¼0.051), globus pallidus (28,  8,  3, Z¼2.99,
Psvc¼0.043) and periaqueductal gray (6,  34,  15,
Z¼2.96, Psvc¼0.034), and at an uncorrected P<0.001
and cluster extent five voxels, in the left insula ( 40,  6,
12, Z¼3.32), postcentral gyrus (54,  18, 44, Z¼3.74),
left STS ( 56,  24, 0, Z¼3.39) and left SII ( 58,  16,
26, Z¼3.35). I.e. with higher levels of emotional aware-
ness, there was a reduced effect of social attention in these
regions.
Antagonistic vs affiliative animations For the contrast
of the antagonistic animations with the affiliative anima-
tions, increased LEAS led to increased activity in the left
globus pallidus/hypothalamus ( 14,  2,  2, Z¼3.63,
Psvc¼0.008) and at a trend level in the left anterior cingulate
( 12, 43, 2, Z¼3.23). This latter finding is consistent with
McRae et al. (2008) who found that LEAS scores in women
(but not men) were positively correlated with activity in the
anterior cingulate to high, but not low, arousal emotional
images.
Antagonistic vs affiliative animations: amplification by
social attention No significant correlations were seen for
this contrast.
Affiliative vs antagonistic animations For the contrast of
the affiliative animations with the antagonistic animations,
increased LEAS was correlated with increased activity in
the insula bilaterally ( 36,  1,  13, Z¼3.95, Psvc¼0.019;
48, 2, 2, Z¼3.68, Psvc¼0.041), and the periaqueductal gray
(8,  36,  20, Z¼3.33, Psvc¼0.045). In addition, at an
uncorrected P<0.001 and a cluster extent of five voxels,
this contrast was associated with activation in the globus
pallidus (24,  16,  4, Z¼3.49). Notably, the pallidal cor-
relation for affiliative animations and LEAS fell relatively
more posterior to the correlation with antagonistic anima-
tions (Figure 5). An analogous anterior–posterior division in
the pallidum has been observed in the rat brain (Smith and
Berridge, 2005; see Discussion section). At this same thresh-
old positive correlations were also seen in the cingulate gyrus
( 2, 25, 30, Z¼3.44) and posterior cingulate (2,  41, 4,
Z¼3.44).
Affiliative vs antagonistic animations: amplification by
social attention Attention to social meaning correlated pos-
itively with LEAS in the contrast of the affiliative vs
Fig. 4 Increased levels of emotional awareness are associated with increased left temporal polar activation (A), and decreased levels of emotional awareness are associated with
increased right premotor activation (B) whilst viewing emotional relative to neutral animations.
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 17, Z¼3.01, Psvc¼0.031).
DISCUSSION
With the goal of locating the neural structures involved
in processing emotion from motion dynamics, and how
these were influenced by selective attention and levels of
emotional awareness, healthy volunteers viewed animations
of affiliative, antagonistic and neutral interactions. Our find-
ings suggest that neural representation of emotion is criti-
cally dependent on individual differences in emotional
complexity.
Brain regions sensitive to emotion (antagonistic and
affiliative vs neutral interactions)
According to Michotte (1950) the detection of emotion is
grounded in the analysis of motion cues, e.g. approach,
avoidance, contact intensity. Consistent with this, we
found that participants could extract not just emotional
valence ( ) and arousal, but complex social meanings
from our simple animations. Regardless of task, viewing
emotional animations, relative to neutral animations,
resulted in activation across a distributed set of neural struc-
tures implicated in processing emotions and social inten-
tions from facial, vocal and bodily expressions, and in
the representation of one’s own emotions (amygdala, lateral
FG, posterior STS, SII, OBFC, premotor cortex, TP,
hypothalamus, insula and DMPFC) (Frith and Frith, 2003;
Heberlein and Adolphs, 2007; Kober et al., 2008; Heberlein
and Atkinson, 2009). Our results refine previous findings
that lesions encompassing, but not restricted to, amygdala
(Heberlein and Adolphs, 2004) and somatosensory cortices
(Heberlein et al., 2003) result in a diminished use of affective
and social words to describe the original Heider and Simmel
animation.
Interaction between social attention and emotion
The influence of attention on the neural processing of emo-
tion cues is a key issue (Adolphs, 2008). Our attentional
manipulation was realised by directly cueing participants
to pay attention to social or spatial attributes of the sprites’
motion. Attention to social meaning resulted in increased
activity in the dorsal ACC, together with SII, insula and
DMPFC. Previous studies have shown heightened activity
in these regions when attending to facial expression: dACC
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001), which might supervise ‘top–down’
attentional allocation to salient emotional and social stimuli
(Peers and Lawrence, 2009); SII and insula (Winston et al.,
2003), lesions to which impair explicit emotion recognition
(Adolphs et al., 2000, 2002; Heberlein et al., 2004; Pitcher
et al., 2008), and which are involved in processing the
somatic and visceral aspects of self and others emotions
(Damasio et al., 2000; Heberlein and Adolphs, 2007); and
DMPFC, which is involved in processing the affective mean-
ings which generate emotions by the cognitive route
(Teasdale et al., 1999; Ochsner et al., 2009), and mental
state attribution or theory of mind more generally
(Amodio and Frith 2006; Frith and Frith, 2003; Moriguchi
et al., 2006; van Overwalle, 2009).
Brain regions sensitive to social interaction type
(antagonistic vs affiliative)
When compared with the affiliative animations, antagonistic
ones activated bilateral early visual cortex (BA 17–19), right
pSTS and right postcentral gyrus. This is consistent with
previous studies of dynamic facial and bodily expression
processing (Grosbras and Paus, 2006; Gre `zes et al., 2007;
Kilts et al., 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2004).
These activations might have been due to differences
between the animations in motion content (the circles of
the antagonistic animations moved consistently more and
at a faster pace), or in emotional valence or arousal (in the
post-scanning behavioural ratings the antagonistic anima-
tions were considered to be more emotionally intense).
Early visual areas, pSTS and premotor cortex are all sensitive
to biological motion (Casile et al., 2009; Jastorff and Orban,
2009; Pelphrey et al., 2003), as well as emotional valence and
arousal (Lane et al., 1999; Sugurladze et al., 2003). The
relative contributions of kinematics and arousal may be
impossible to differentiate, as, consistent with Michotte’s
(1950) proposals, there is a very direct relationship between
the kinematic properties (e.g. velocity) of biological motion
Fig. 5 In red, the correlation of LEAS with the contrast affiliative vs antagonistic
animations (social and spatial tasks). In green, the correlation of LEAS with the
contrast antagonistic vs affiliative animations (social and spatial tasks). Highlighted
with the white circles are the left and right pallidum, respectively.
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Chouchourelou et al., 2006; Ikeda and Watanabe, 2009;
Pavlova et al., 2005; Pollick et al., 2001; Roether et al.,
2009). We found no increase in amygdala activity for antag-
onistic relative to affiliative films. This contrasts with some
studies (Carter and Pelphrey, 2008; Sinke et al., 2010), but is
consistent with lesion work (Heberlein and Adolphs, 2004)
and likely relates to the complexity of the affiliative interac-
tions or the lack of imminent threat to the viewer in our
antagonistic interactions (which were viewed ‘from above’)
(Sinke et al., 2010).
Interaction between social attention and social
interaction type
Under social attention, we observed differential activations
of the OBFC, with the antagonistic animations activating
medial OBFC and the affiliative animations activating an
inferior and more lateral OBFC region. This finding is con-
sistent with a recent study which reported that words with
increasing negative valence were associated with increased
activity in medial OBFC/subgenual cingulate, whereas
increasing positive valence was associated with increased
activity in lateral OBFC (Lewis et al., 2006). It is unlikely,
however, that these differences simply reflect differences in
emotional valence ( ) between the films, since Kringelbach
and Rolls (2004) have shown in a meta-analysis that medial
and lateral OFC are both capable of coding rewarding
(i.e. positive valence) and punishing (i.e. negative valence)
information. Rather, the differences in OBFC may relate to
some more specific aspect of the type of social interaction
(antagonistic vs affiliative) and its implications for the
viewer. For example, Mobbs et al. (2007) found that
medial OBFC/subgenual cingulate was specifically activated
by remote, rather than imminent threats; whereas Nitschke
et al. (2004) found that lateral OBFC was activated when
mothers viewed their own infants (i.e. a specifically affiliative
condition) and Sollberger et al. (2009) found that alterations
in warm, affiliative personality traits, but not other interper-
sonal traits, were correlated with structural changes in lateral
orbitofrontal cortex in individuals with neurodegenerative
diseases. The specific nature of emotion coding in medial
vs lateral OBFC, which form distinct neural networks
(Price, 2007) is an important topic for future investigation.
Correlations with LEAS
LEAS and brain regions responsive to emotional
content. Lane and Schwartz (1987) proposed that a per-
son’s ability to recognise and describe emotion in oneself
and others, called emotional awareness or complexity,
undergoes a five-stage structural development. A fundamen-
tal tenet of this model is that individual differences in
emotional awareness reflect variations in the degree and dif-
ferentiation of the ‘schema’ used to process emotional infor-
mation. The first two stages of development are
‘action-oriented’ emotion processing stages, namely bodily
sensations and actions tendencies. The three remaining
stages, single emotions, blends of emotion and combinations
of blends, are associated with more highly differentiated
emotional knowledge (for self and others) (Lane, 2000,
2008; Lane and Pollermann, 2002), that is with a proposi-
tional (e.g. conceptual) knowledge of emotion (Lindquist
and Barrett, 2008). In our study, for the main effect of emo-
tion (i.e. independent of attentional set), LEAS scores corre-
lated positively with activity in the left TP, and negatively
with activity in the hypothalamus and the right precentral
gyrus. Left TP activity has been associated with detailed emo-
tional perspective taking (Derntl et al., 2010; Ruby and
Decety, 2004), in narrative and story processing (Maguire
et al., 1999) and more generally with the level of specificity
of retrieved semantic knowledge (Grabowski et al., 2001;
Rogers et al., 2006), as part of a semantic ‘hub’ (Patterson
et al., 2007). Burnett et al. (2009) found that left TP activity
when processing social emotions increased from adolescence
to adulthood, consistent with the increasing refinement of
emotion categories during development (Widen and Russell,
2008). Thus, consistent with LEAS theory, increasing emo-
tional complexity is linked with increased neural coding of
emotion in the semantic system.
Conversely, lower emotional complexity was associated
with increased activity in the hypothalamus, a visceromotor
structure (Thompson and Swanson, 2003) and premotor
cortex [(Z ¼ 40), falling within ventral premotor cortex
(Tomassini et al., 2007)]. The latter region has been identi-
fied as a key node in a putative human ‘mirror neuron
system’ (Morin and Gre `zes, 2008), implicated in goal-direc-
ted action observation (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) and
activated in previous studies of the perception and produc-
tion of emotional actions (Gre `zes et al., 2007; Grosbras and
Paus, 2006; Henenlotter et al., 2005; Leslie et al., 2004; van
der Gaag et al., 2007; Warren et al., 2006; Zaki et al., 2009).
The negative correlation with LEAS suggests, again consis-
tent with Lane’s model of emotional awareness, that low
LEAS is associated with a greater tendency to encode
emotional information in an action-oriented and visceral
fashion. These findings place critical constraints on ‘motor’
theories of empathy (Gallese et al., 2004; Pfeifer et al., 2008;
Montgomery et al., 2009).
LEAS, social attention and social interaction
type. Higher LEAS scores did not predict greater activity
in any region during the social vs spatial attention condition.
Rather, we found a negative correlation between LEAS score
and amplification of activity as a function of social attention
in several cortical (STS, insula, SII) and subcortical (globus
pallidus, periacqueductal gray) regions. That is, the atten-
tional amplification of emotional content, in STS and
insula, was attenuated in individuals with increasing emo-
tional complexity, presumably because heightened emotional
complexity is associated with a greater default tendency to
attend to emotional and social information, thus reducing
the impact of instructed attentional set (Ciarrochi et al.,
Complexity of emotion representations SCAN (2011) 1052003, 2005). The finding that LEAS score positively corre-
lated with activity in regions linked to detailed semantic
processing (left TPs) regardless of task, is also consistent
with this suggestion. Ongoing work is examining the
extent to which individual differences in emotional complex-
ity influences patterns of brain activity during explicit retrie-
val of detailed emotional knowledge.
Increased emotional differentiation as indexed by
increased LEAS score, was accompanied by an increased
neural differentiation between the positive and negative ani-
mations within the pallidum, where activation to antagonis-
tic animations showed a positive correlation with LEAS in
the anterior pallidum, whereas activation to affiliative
animations showed a positive correlation with LEAS in the
posterior pallidum. Smith and Berridge (2005) found
evidence for an anterior–posterior ‘hedonic gradient’ in the
rat pallidum reflecting increased ‘liking’ of foods. Our find-
ings suggest increased differentiation between emotions of
different valence with increasing LEAS in regions coding
basic ‘building blocks’ of emotional valence. This accords
with the hierarchical organisation of levels of emotional
awareness theory, in which functioning at each level adds
to and modifies the functioning of previous levels (Lane,
2000, 2008). The greater differences seen between affiliative
and antagonistic animations with increasing LEAS score
in regions implicated in processing affiliative signals
(the insula) (Henenlotter et al., 2005) and basic affiliative
behaviours (PAG) (Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Lonstein and
Stern, 1997), are also consistent with Lane’s theory.
Increased LEAS scores are associated with heightened inter-
personal closeness (Lumley et al., 2005).
In conclusion, simple motion cues alone communicate
rich information about emotional interactions and trigger
widespread activity across a range of structures implicated
in processing emotion and social information. Regions
including dACC were modulated by selective attention to
social meaning. Critically, individual differences in emo-
tional complexity profoundly influenced the neural coding
of such cues, and the influence of attention, as predicted by
Lane’s model of Levels of Emotional Awareness (Lane 2000;
Lane et al., 1990). Increased levels of emotional awareness
predicted increased semantic neural emotion coding,
whereas decreased levels of emotional awareness predicted
visceral and action-oriented coding. If extended and con-
firmed, results of this type could do much to clarify why
the effects on emotion processing of lesions to specific
regions are subject to individual variation. Indeed, future
fMRI studies in this domain would benefit from including
measures of individual differences in emotional complexity
on a more routine basis.
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